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FEATURE: 
The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and information concerning the development and improvement of 
the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY 
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liAs a result of parochialism, poor leadership, faulty organi ' rl1 ~ 
zation, and plain stubborn selfishness, the Army now finds b-< 
itself beset on all sides. Its reaction has been predictable. 
The majority of career and noncommissioned officers have tended 
to blame the "outside" with paranoid ferocity. The increasingly 
obvious failure of Army tactics and policies in Vietnam, Europe, 
and elsewhere have as usual been ignored. Apologists like 
General Westmoreland have blamed political restraints for lack 
of total victory. They have tried to delude the men of the 
Army and the country that the Army has been successful in Vietnam 
and that the unenlightened will eventually realize this." 
Edward L. King, Lt Col USA (Ret.), The Death of the Army 
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EDITORIAL COMMENT: This issue includes the first part of a two part dialogue on the 
all-volunteer Army. The first part is written from the point of view that this move 
towards an all-volunteer force poses a serious threat to the civilian control of national 
policy. Next week its sequel will consider the military's point of view. This article 
was written for the magazine, MILITARY REVIEW, in June of 1972 by David Syrett, Associate 
Professor of History at Queens College of the City University of New York and Richard H. 
Kohn, Assistant Professor of History at Rutgers University. 
liThe Dangers of an All-Volunteer Army" 
Ever since Barry Goldwater seriously suggested jettisoning the draft in favor of 
an all-volunteer Army in 1964, the idea has grown steadily in popularity. No one likes 
the draft in any form, especially those eligible during an unpopular war, and recent 
reports of large-scale evasion show that the system, even with a lottery, may be unworkable. 
Besides, so the argument goes, a volunteer Army is our traditional peacetime force since 
only in the Cold War have we used a draft to fill up the ranks. Now, with a pay raise 
for the services and projected cutbacks in the draft and the size of the Army, Congress 
seems to be accepting an all-volunteer Army without directly considering its consequences. 
So far, the opposition has used three basic arguments: that it will not work because 
it will not attract enough men, that it is too expensive, or, as Senator Edward Kennedy 
has argued, that it would create an all-professional force that would tempt the Government 
to be more militaristic in foreign policy. All these points may be valid, but only 
Senator Kennedy has asked the really key question: Is it a good idea politically? 
The Senator fears that an all-volunteer Army would have practically no middle-class 
youth. The Government would then be likely to suffer far less political attack in 
committing the Army to battle than if the troops were more representative of the electorate. 
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But this argument is weak because an all-volunteer force would never be sufficient for even 
a limited war, and military and civilian planners know this. Such an Army would only be a 
peacetime force. The real danger, which few opponents of the plan have raised, is internal. 
An all-volunteer Army at this stage might pose a tremendous threat to civilian control of 
policy and may even make the coup - for the first time in American history - a possibility. 
To realize the danger, one must first ask who will make up the enlisted ranks. Senator 
Kennedy's argument that they will be filled by the poor and by minorities is persuasive. 
Even if military pay is raised further or educational benefits guaranteed or fast promotion 
promised, military life is confining enough to discourage young men with other alternatives. 
The changes in Army life may only be temporary responses to the stresses caused by an 
unpopular war and the need for enlistments in an antimilitary age. Like similar "reforms" 
after World War II and Korea, they are not likely to be permanent because they undermine 
discipline. 
An all volunteer force will more likely go the route of the Marines - "l ean and tough." 
And it will attract men who like that kind of thing. Many will not stay for a career if the 
economy can provide a job or a place in college. Even the poor black, once he is trained 
to run the Army's automated battlefield, will be tempted to use his new skills in more 
lucrative or less-demanding civilian jobs. Those who stay and become the noncommissioned 
officers - the heart of the Army - will stay because they like the life, accept military 
ideals, or are loyal to the Army. They will not be staying for the retirement benefits in a 
country moving toward a guaranteed income and national health insurance. 
This kind of Army would be unlike any in American history. For one thing, it would be 
at least three times the size of the Army before 1940. Before 1940, the volunteer Army was 
mostly poor whites and immigrants who enlisted out of lack of opportunity or to learn the 
language and adjust to the United States. If they re-enlisted, it was because they had no 
choice or wanted the pension. In general, they were a drunken, rowdy brutal, uneducated 
lot who often deserted - not the kind of men who would be satisfactory in an all-volunteer 
Army today. 
Like the pre-1940 Army, the all-volunteer force will come from the "l ower class." 
But, today, these men will come from a lower class that is far more urban, more conscious 
and more alienated from American life, politics and the Government. They will be 
urban and southern poor and blacks, not farm boys and immigrants who viewed the United 
States and its institutions favorably. The volunteers who re-enlist and become careerists 
will be professional soldiers, isolated from civil society and owing allegiance not 
to country, political party or family, but to service, unit and comrades. 
Allegiances such as these can be found in varying intensity not only among such hard-
bitten organizations as the French Foreign Legion, but also, as sociological stUdies have 
shown, in paramilitary bodies such as the New York City Police Department. All armies have 
a tendency to change men's allegiance and outlook on life and, at times, to instill in their 
ranks an attitude which borders on religious mysticism. The all-volunteer Army will be what 
Donald Duncan implied a few years ago: the "New Legions." All they will need is a Caesar 
and a Rubi con. 
Will they have it? There is evidence that the preconditions for the classic coup in 
Western society already exist in the United States: social dislocation, rapid and confusing _ 
economic and technological change, and uncertain lifestyles and values. More frightening 
are some symptoms in the Military Establishment. Ward Just, in his recent book Military 
Men, shows just how distraught certain elements in the officer corps are over Vietnam, 
how closely some of them are coming to view themselves as the scapegoat for civilian 
incompetence in the war. Like the French officer corps in Algeria, they feel stabbed 
in the back. 
In a country whose values and attitudes are no longer based on the eternal verities, 
some in the officer corps are coming to see the Army as the standard - and the preserver -
of the true ideals of the Nation. The acceptance of a "sacred mission" is just what 
led the armies of France and Germany to intervene in domestic politics. If the volunteer 
Army, which will need less officers, phases out Reserve Officers I Training Corps and 
depends on West Point and the "Legi ons II for its offi cers, the danger may well be greater. 
Nearly every scenario of the coup d'etat has included such an alienated officer corps, 
and the attempt invariably comes in the wake of a particularly unsuccessful or frustrating 
war. The most serious incident in the history of US civil-military relations came during 
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the Korean War when Doublas MacArthur almost usurped the war's conduct from the President. 
And what could provoke the action is if, at the same time, the Government came to an 
accommodation with the Soviets, especially if alienated officers feel the agreement 
jeopardizes US security and "Communist" elements in the country are on the verge of 
getting it ratified. A SALT agreement could do to President Nixon what the hypothetical 
disarmament treaty did to the fictional President in Seven Days in May. 
What only remains is a Caesar. Probably because he feared competition in a possible 
bid for re-election, Lyndon Johnson was careful to keep his field commanders generally 
in the background. All the old heroes - MacArthur, LeM~, the World War II groups - are 
gone. But recent coups in underdeveloped nations have not been by heroes but the 
faceless juntas of colonels who never even saw combat. No one knows what hero may 
emerge in some future limited war, or even out of this one. Perhaps 15 years from now, 
~ a heroic returnee from the North Vietnamese prisoner of war camps could be the one. If 
previous wars have produced Presidents and near Presidents, Vietnam could produce a 
mil i tary hero. 
The most obvious check against the military playing a large role in US domestic 
politics is the fact that the majority of junior officers and privates are civilians 
in uniform. These men would not take part in, nor would they permit, a military coup. 
But, with a professional Army, it might be a different story. The British Regular 
Army almost brought civil war to Britain over the Irish question just before World 
War I. And regular paratroops and Legion units attempted to overthrow De Gaulle 
because of his Algerian policy. 
These are obvious examples of the professional military at tempting to influence 
a nation's domestic politics. However, the intrusion of a professional army into 
politics is usually more subtle than the staging of a coup. A threat, a hint, a 
suggestion or a silence on the part of a politically minded army is all that is usually 
needed to bring the civil authorities to heel. De Gaulle, before he could deal with 
the Paris student riots, had to go to the headquarters of the French Army in Germany to 
find out if the generals would support him. In its sphere, the Army would have an 
iron grip on the Nation just as the New York Pol ice in a recent "job action" held the 
safety of New York City in their hands. 
All of this sounds ridiculous. Our officers are loyal Americans; conditions are 
not the same in the United States. The American people would not stand for it. And 
yet these are strange times. The Army faces, for the first time, the psychological 
stress of something approaching failure in a war, and no one can predict the consequences. 
Every study of the national security process in recent years points to increasing 
civilianization and politicization of the leadership of the Armed Forces. While 
civilianization undermines the professionalism of the officer corps (the great bulwark 
of civilian control), on the enlisted and junior officer levels, it acts as an ultimate 
check against direct military interference in politics. To destroy this civilian 
influence in a moment of anxiety over a war just ending, and turn the US Army into an 
all-volunteer force, might be courting disaster. 
RUSSIAN NAVY HAS TROUBLE GETTING SHIPS: This was the April 1, 1973 headline in the 
Los Angeles Times relating to the budget squeeze that our Soviet naval counterparts are 
also experiencing. Intelligence sources have reported a recent conversation between a 
Soviet naval attache and an American naval attache assigned to an Asian capital. The 
Soviet navy had asked for authority to build eight aircraft carriers, but their civilian 
bosses only allowed two. The first of these Soviet carriers, the 600-foot, 40,OOO-ton 
Kiev, is being fitted out at a Black Sea shipyard before going to sea. Her sister ship, 
the Minsk, is under construction at the same yard. U.S. intelligence reports indicate 
the carriers will be used principally for long-range operations against the U.S. missile-
firing submarines. 
EDITORIAL 
Little comment has been received by the EDITORS regarding the BAROMETER's first 
issue in returning to an active status. However, such beliefs that it is a Management 
Curriculum credit project, weekly weather forecast from the Meteorology Department, or 
general campus scandal sheet are completely false. The BAROMETER is definitely a 
student newspaper with the purpose of encouraging professional development at the 
Postgraduate School. In order for the exchange of ideas to take place, we need inputs 
from ~, the students, staff and faculty. 
